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A
s governments around the world struggle 
to find appropriate ways of regulating 
the activities of digital platforms, a form 
of “guided self-regulation” seems to be 
emerging, with voluntary codes governing aspects 
such as the spread of disinformation as well as 
commercial relations between publishers and 
platforms.
Reliance on industry schemes is not a 
new phenomenon. In Australia, as in other 
jurisdictions, governments have long recognised 
that in the right circumstances, self-regulation 
offers a pragmatic and effective alternative to the 
various forms of government regulation.1 However, 
an aspect that has received little attention is the 
extent to which self-regulatory schemes involve 
consumers and citizens in the development of 
codes of practice and other rules. 
As one of the authors has previously argued, 
consultation with citizens and consumers 
is expected of industry regulators; it should 
be regarded as a feature of legitimacy and 
responsiveness on the part of industry schemes, 
especially when governments effectively delegate 
rule-making responsibility to them.2 
In new research completed at the end of 
2019,3 we surveyed the engagement practices - a 
collective term we use to describe various forms 
of consumer and citizen involvement4 - of 19 
industry schemes operating in the advertising, 
media, telecommunications and online sectors in 
Australia. Our research produced an interesting 
result: at least some of the self-regulatory industry 
schemes perform better when engaging consumers 
and citizens in rule-making than the co-regulatory 
schemes. 
LANDSCAPE
Among the 19 schemes we examined, 11 were self-
regulatory, eight co-regulatory. 
l Self-regulatory schemes are schemes that are 
free to establish their own procedures for adopting 
and amending code rules; and their rules are not 
enforced by a government regulator. 
l Co-regulatory schemes are those which have a 
statutory basis; while industry participants (often, 
representative bodies) formulate the rules, the 
codes themselves are notified to, or registered by, a 
government regulator, which has responsibility for 
enforcing them. 
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Self-regulatory schemes. The 11 self-
regulatory schemes we examined included six that 
deal with various aspects of advertising practice, 
ranging from the cross-industry regulation 
administered by the Australian Association of 
National Advertisers (AANA) to industry-specific 
rules such as those administered by the Alcohol 
Beverages Advertising Code (ABAC) scheme. In 
addition, there were three schemes dealing with 
news media standards, with the Australian Press 
Council (APC) having the greatest reach; two self-
regulatory schemes administered by the cross-
industry standards body, Standards Australia; 
and the Australian domain name administration 
scheme known as auDA. The self-regulatory 
schemes are shown in Table 1.       
Co-regulatory schemes. In Australia, 
industry bodies representing sections of the 
broadcasting and telecommunications sectors 
develop co-regulatory codes of practice that are 
registered with the regulator, the Australian 
Communications and Media Authority (ACMA). For 
example, Free TV Australia administers a code for 
commercial television. Other codes are developed 
by (for example) Commercial Radio Australia 
and the Community Broadcasting Association 
of Australia. Telecommunications codes are 
developed by one organisation, Communications 
Alliance. The broadcasting codes are registered 
under Part 9 of the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 
while the telecommunications consumer codes are 
registered under Part 6 of the Telecommunications 
Act 1997. Certain internet codes are also 
registered by the ACMA or its offshoot, the eSafety 
Commissioner.5 In addition, there are codes 
of practice notified to the ACMA by Australia’s 
two state-funded broadcasters, the Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) and the Special 
Broadcasting Service (SBS).6 The co-regulatory 
schemes are shown in Table 2.7 
The statutory basis for registering co-regulatory 
codes is significant; the ACMA or eSafety 
Commissioner must be satisfied (among other 
things) that certain minimum consumer or public 
consultation standards have been met. For the 
broadcasting codes, the ACMA must be satisfied 
that “members of the public have been given an 
adequate opportunity to comment on the code”; 
whereas for the telecommunications codes, 
the ACMA must be satisfied that “at least one 
body or association that represents the interests 
of consumers has been consulted about the 
development of the code”.8
OUR RESEARCH APPROACH 
To document the engagement activities of 
the various self- and co-regulatory schemes, 
we compiled summaries based on publicly 
available material, amended these in response to 
comments from 15 of the schemes, then invited 
representatives to attend a round table meeting in 
Sydney. We ran parallel round table meetings with 
regulator representatives and with representatives 
from consumer and public interest groups to 
obtain their views on the ways in which industry 
schemes engage them when formulating rules. 
Our review led to a list of 22 different 
mechanisms used by one or more of the schemes 
over a number of years. Table 3 below incorporates 
all of these mechanisms. The most commonly used 
mechanisms were written submissions and data 
collection.
After completing our own consultation activities 
and reviewing the international academic 
literature that classifies consultation mechanisms, 
we developed a matrix of these mechanisms. 
Form of engagement. We classified them first 
according to the form of engagement. By this we 
mean the mode of communication or interaction 
that in some way enables consumer or citizen 
views to be taken into account. For example, 
we separated the act of collecting existing data 
on consumer or citizen views from the act of 
seeking input via a mechanism such as written 
submissions. 
Rule-making function. But then we also 
classified them according to the rule-making 
functions of the scheme. Here, for example, we 
separated the function of identifying issues from 
the function of drafting rules.9 
The four forms of engagement and the four rule-
making functions we identified are set out in the 
matrix in Table 3.    
We used the matrix, and the observations 
of industry, government and consumer 
representatives, to make some observations on 
the extent to which the schemes were able to 
promote and embrace engagement, as well as the 
limitations of some of these mechanisms. 
WHAT WE FOUND
There was wide use of both written submissions 
and data collection, but other mechanisms were 
used selectively. Some organisations favoured 
certain mechanisms which had never been used by 
others.
The factors influencing decisions about which 
mechanisms to use were as follows:
l the importance of the proposed rule or the 
change to existing rules
l the number of proposed rules or changes to 
existing rules
l the complexity of the underlying subject 
matter
l the anticipated receipt of competing consumer 
or citizen viewpoints on specific issues
l government scrutiny
l the expectations of relevant regulatory bodies
l cost and other resource-related implications.
A count of the number of mechanisms used 
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TABLE 1: SELF-REGULATORY SCHEMES
Scheme consists of ABAC Alcohol Marketing 
Code, the Alcohol Advertising Pre-vetting Service 
and a complaints adjudication process. 
Administers the .au domain and associated 
second-level domains.
Represents advertisers.
The “principal industry body for data-driven 
marketing and advertising”; one of four 
organisations of the Australian Alliance for Data 
Leadership Limited. 
Represents Australia’s food, drink and grocery 
manufacturing industry. Members include Coca-
Cola, Kellogg and Arnott’s.
“The principal body with responsibility for setting 
standards and responding to complaints about 
material in Australian newspapers, magazines, 
their associated digital outlets, as well as a 
growing number of online-only publications.”
The peak industry organisation representing 
the manufacturers and importers of passenger 
vehicles, light commercial vehicles and 
motorcycles in Australia.
Established by Seven West Media in 2012 to 
address reader complaints by publisher members. 
Administers the relevant rules (see next column), 
which are developed by members of the Australia 
Digital Advertising Alliance. 
Union representing journalists and other media 
workers.
Responsible for the development of Australian 
standards, including standards relating to 
communications, information technology and 
e-commerce services.
ABAC Responsible Alcohol Marketing Code
21 policies
Code of Ethics; AANA Code for Advertising and 
Marketing Communications to Children; AANA 
Food and Beverages Advertising and Marketing 
Communications Code; AANA Environmental 
Claims Code; AANA Wagering Advertising and 
Marketing Communications Code
ADMA Code of Practice
Responsible Children’s Marketing Initiative 
for the Australian Food and Beverage 
Industry; Quick Service Restaurant Initiative 
for Responsible Advertising and Marketing 
to Children
The Statement of General Principles; The 
Statement of Privacy Principles; Specific 
Standards (Coverage of Suicide; Contacting 
Patients) and 13 non-binding Advisory 
Guidelines
Voluntary Code of Practice for Motor Vehicle 
Advertising
Code of Conduct
Australian Best Practice Guidelines Interest 
Based Advertising (or online behavioural 
advertising) (September 2014); Social 
Advertising Best Practice Guidelines 2013
Journalist Code of Ethics
Various standards




Advertising Code scheme 
(ABAC scheme)
.au Domain Administration 
Limited (auDA)
Australian Association 
of National Advertisers 
(AANA)
Australian Direct Marketing 
Association (ADMA)
Australian Food and Grocery 
Council 
(AFGC)
Australian Press Council 
(APC)
Federal Chamber of 
Automotive Industries 
(FCAI)





Media, Entertainment and 
Arts Alliance (MEAA)
Standards Australia
TABLE 2: CO-REGULATORY SCHEMES
Various functions, including providing within 
Australia innovative and comprehensive 
broadcasting services of a high standard.
Represents free-to-air community television 
channels.
“Peak industry body representing Low Power 
Open Narrowcast (LPON) Radio services and 
the High Power Open Narrowcast (HPON) Radio 
services located across all States and Territories 
of Australia.”
Represents the Australian subscription media 
industry in Australia.
The primary industry body and industry co-
regulatory body in the Australian communications 
sector.
Represents the interests of community radio 
broadcasters.
Represents Australia’s commercial radio industry.
Represents all of Australia’s commercial free-to-
air television licensees.
Its principal function is to provide multilingual and 
multicultural radio, television and digital media 
services that inform, educate and entertain all 
Australians and, in doing so, reflect Australia’s 
multicultural society. 
ABC Code of Practice
Community Television Broadcasting
Codes of Practice
Open Narrowcast Radio Codes of Practice
Subscription Broadcast Television Codes of 
Practice 2013; Subscription Narrowcast Code 
of Practice 2013; Subscription Narrowcast 
Radio Codes of Practice 2013
Various, including the Telecommunications 
Consumer Protections Code
Community Radio Broadcasting 
Codes of Practice
Commercial Radio Code of Practice (15 
March 2017)
Commercial Television Industry Code of 
Practice 2015
SBS Codes of Practice








Australian Narrowcast Radio 
Association (ANRA)
Australian Subscription 






Association of Australia 
(CBAA)
Commercial Radio Australia 
(CRA)
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by each scheme does not provide much insight 
into the depth of engagement undertaken, but it 
provides some useful information:
l Among the self-regulatory schemes, at least 
two of the advertising schemes appear to have no 
mechanisms for public engagement, whereas the 
most prominent advertising scheme, operated by 
AANA, has used seven mechanisms of engagement, 
as has auDA.
l Among the broadcasting co-regulatory 
schemes, several used three or four mechanisms, 
but the telecommunications co-regulatory scheme 
operated by Communications Alliance used 13 
different mechanisms.
More significantly, our classification scheme 
allowed us to identify some mechanisms that 
provide a more expansive opportunity for dialogue 
with consumers or citizens, compared to those 
which gather pre-existing data or which engage 
with consumers or citizens only after rules have 
already been formed:
l Among the co-regulatory schemes, the most 
prominent broadcasting scheme, operated by 
Free TV Australia, reported using information 
dissemination (for example, issuing discussion 
papers on proposed changes, as well as media 
releases and social media posts), complaints data 
and regulator research, all of which fall into the 
first two forms of engagement (data collection 
and public communication), but perhaps the 
main mechanism it uses is written submissions 
on draft rules, which falls into the third form of 
engagement (public input). 
l In contrast, the telecommunications scheme 
operated by Communications Alliance uses a 
wide variety of mechanisms covering all four 
forms of engagement. These include appointing 
consumer representatives to working committees 
that draft code rules - one of the few examples we 
found of the fourth type of engagement (public 
participation). 
l Among the self-regulatory schemes, auDA and 
AANA demonstrated the most variation in the 
mechanisms used, with each using mechanisms 
from three of the four forms of engagement. 
In the case of auDA, this involved information 
dissemination; focus groups; public fora; meetings 
with a rule-maker; surveys of consumers or 
the public; written submissions on both an 
issues paper and draft rules; and appointing a 
consumer or public interest representative to a 
working committee. For AANA (in some cases 
through its associated complaints-handling 
body, Ad Standards) these mechanisms were 
complaints data; a sentiment index; information 
dissemination; meetings with a rule-maker; 
surveys of consumers or the public; and written 
submissions on an issues paper. 
Limitations on access to information prevent us 
making definitive statements about the schemes 
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overall, but our classification matrix does allow us to compare 
the schemes’ selection of engagement mechanisms, as some 
mechanisms are likely to require more investment of resources 
and to provide a richer insight into consumer and citizen views. 
To make this comparison, we distinguish the first two forms of 
engagement (data collection and public communication) from the 
second two (public input and public participation). Mechanisms 
that fall within the public input and public participation 
categories are likely to provide more meaningful opportunities for 
engagement. When we analyse our results using this approach, we 
see that some schemes stand out from others:
l Communications Alliance far exceeds all other schemes in 
the use of the third and fourth forms of engagement. Ten of the 
12 mechanisms it uses are of these kinds, and include two forms 
of public participation (working committees and consumer views 
sought by a consumer body);
l both auDA and the Community Broadcasting Association of 
Australia use six such mechanisms, including working committees, 
while SBS and AANA both use four. 
One of the most significant aspects of variation occurred in 
relation to comment on draft rules, and how this occurs. Of 
the 20 schemes we identified, seven self-regulatory schemes do 
not publish their rules in draft and/or provide an opportunity 
to make written submissions. These are the schemes operated 
by ABAC, AANA, the ABC, the APC, the Federal Chamber of 
Automotive Industries, the Interactive Advertising Bureau, and the 
Independent Media Council. The other 13 schemes (a mix of self- 
and co-regulatory schemes) permit written submissions of some 
kind – whether at proposal stage, on an issues paper, or on draft 
rules. 
Written submissions are the most popular engagement 
mechanism in our sample, and a number of our round table 
participants said they are helpful. However, we found – in the 
literature as well as in feedback from our round table meetings 
– that this mechanism has some limitations. For example, the 
auDA representative said “we’ve averaged between 20 to 50 
submissions over the length of policy review processes, which is in 
no way reflective or has any great scalability and probably doesn’t 
influence the process to any great extent”. And although the Free 
TV representative noted that over 2,000 written submissions had 
been received during one consultation, almost all of these were in 
similar terms as part of a consumer campaign, with only 11 other 
substantive submissions. 
Perhaps more significantly, consumer representatives drew 
attention to “motivational barriers” and other problems that arise 
when a scheme relies on written submissions.10 Some obstacles 
cited were: “submission fatigue”; the perception that consumers 
were commenting on something that was “already a done deal”; 
the lack of “trust that if you’re going to put time into doing 
a submission … that anything is going to come out of it”; and 
the absence of feedback from industry following submission of 
written comments. Expecting written submissions from “missing 
stakeholders”, for example, those from vulnerable communities 
often missing from regulatory activities, was particularly 
problematic. Our participants cited the following examples of 
people whose interests may not be represented in the regulatory 
environment: homeless people, women escaping domestic 
violence, and people living in geographically remote communities 
(which in the Australian environment includes remote indigenous 
communities).
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CONCLUSIONS 
While our research shows considerable variation in engagement 
among the various schemes we examined, one of the co-regulatory 
schemes (Communications Alliance) is the stand-out performer 
in terms of the number and type of engagement mechanisms it 
uses. However, a surprising outcome was the extent to which some 
of the self-regulatory schemes seem to exceed the efforts of their 
co-regulatory counterparts. auDA and AANA both use a variety of 
mechanisms, while the APC includes public representatives on the 
body that makes decisions about codes; the Media Entertainment 
and Arts Alliance uses a working committee that involves public 
members; and ABAC conducts focus groups and surveys. 
Use of these mechanisms, which require schemes to proactively 
engage with consumers or citizens, stands in contrast to 
the standard mechanisms of complaints data and written 
submissions routinely used by some of the broadcasting bodies. It 
is particularly surprising that the long established and publicly 
funded national broadcaster, the ABC, does not offer the public 
the opportunity to comment before it adopts new rules.
This positive finding about some of the self-regulatory schemes 
does need to be set in context. Other self-regulatory schemes 
appear to conduct no consumer or citizen engagement, or 
conduct very minimal engagement, using mechanisms that are 
unlikely to provide much consumer or citizen insight. 
In terms of improvements that could be made, our research 
leads us to conclude that more is needed of some of the 
established co-regulatory schemes, while some of the self-
regulatory schemes may need encouragement from government 
to improve their engagement practices if they are to be regarded 
as effective alternatives to government regulation.
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